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Summary 
Happiness is defined as the degree to which a person enjoys his or her life-as-a-whole. 
Accordingly ‘Gross National Happiness’ is defined as the degree to which citizens in a 
country enjoy the life they live. Individual happiness can be measured by self-report on a 
single standard question. Hence Gross National Happiness can be measured by the average 
response to such questions in general populations surveys. 
 Survey data on average self-report of happiness can be combined with estimates of 
life-expectancy based on civil registration. The resulting index denotes how long and happy 
people live in a country and can be expressed in a number of Happy-Life-Years (HLY). 
 Comparison across present day nations shows huge differences on this indicator, HLY 
varying between 63 (Switzerland) and 21 (Moldavia). About 80% of these differences can be 
explained by variation in societal characteristics, such as economic development, political 
democracy and mutual trust. HLY varies also over time. During the last decade it rose in 
western nations but plunged in the former Soviet nations. 
 It is argued that HLY is the best available indicator of Gross National Happiness.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of 'Gross National Happiness' (GNH) was introduced in the political discourse in the 
1960s by the late king of Bhutan, Jigme Dorji Wangchuck. In 1971 the idea was articulated by 
the present King Jigme Singye Wangchuck is his famous statement that "Gross National 
Happiness is more important than Gross National Product" (Priesner 1999: 28). In 1991 the idea 
was mentioned in the Five Year Plan (7th 5-year plan pp. 22) and in 1998 the Prime Minister 
elaborated the idea in an international address (Thingley 1998).  
     These statements did not aim at scientific precision in the first place, but served to 
indicate a political direction. The motto worked well to that end and appeals also outside Bhutan. 
This success now calls for measurement of the matter.  Once we accept the idea that the country 
should aim at Gross National Happiness we need tools to assess how successful the country is in 
realizing that end. 
 
Measuring Gross National Happiness requires first of all that we define what happiness is. To 
that end I start in section 2 with a review the various meanings of the word and select the 
meaning that fits best with official statements on the matter. That is the meaning of 'life-
satisfaction'. In section 3 I will consider the available measures of life-satisfaction in nations and 
conclude that this can best be measured using self-reports. In section 4 I will argue that survey 
data on subjective life-satisfaction can be combined with data on life-expectancy and that the 
resulting estimate of 'happy life years' indicates how long and happy people live in a country. 
Finally in section 5 I review the available data on that matter and consider the merits of that 
measure on that empirical basis.   
 
 
2 CONCEPT OF HAPPINESS 
 
The word happiness is often used interchangeably with the term 'quality of life'. When used in 
that sense it is an umbrella term for different notions of the good life. These notions can be 
ordered on the basis of the following two distinctions:  
     
Chances and outcomes 
A first distinction is between opportunities for a good life and the good life itself. This is the 
difference between potentiality and actuality. I refer to this as 'life-chances'1 and 'life-results'. 
Opportunities and outcomes are related, but are certainly not the same. Chances can fail to be 
realized, due to stupidity or bad luck. Conversely, people sometimes make much of their life in 
spite of poor opportunities. 
 This distinction is quite common in the field of public-health research. Pre-conditions for 
good health, such as adequate nutrition and professional care are seldom mixed up with health 
itself. Yet, in social policy discussions means and ends are less well distinguished. 
  
Outer and inner qualities  
A second difference is between 'external' and 'inner' qualities. In the first case the quality is in the 
environment, in the latter it is in the individual. Lane (1994) made this distinction clear by telling 
'quality of society’ from 'quality of persons'. 
 This distinction is also quite common in public health. External pathogens are 
distinguished from inner afflictions. Yet again, this basic insight is lacking in many social policy 
discussions.  
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2.1 Four qualities of life 
The combination of these two dichotomies yields a fourfold matrix. This classification is 
presented in scheme 1. The distinction between chances and results is presented vertically, the 
difference between outer and inner qualities horizontally.  
 In the upper half of the scheme, we see two variants of potential quality of life, with next 
to the outer opportunities in one's environment, the inner capacities to exploit these. The 
environmental chances can be denoted by the term livability, the personal capacities with the 
word life-ability. This difference is not new. In sociology, the distinction between 'social capital' 
and 'psychological capital' is sometimes used in this context. In the psychology of stress, the 
difference is labeled negatively in terms of 'burden' and 'bearing power'.  
 The lower half of the scheme is about the quality of life with respect to its outcomes. 
These outcomes can be judged by their value for one's environment and by value for oneself. The 
external worth of a life is denoted by the term utility of life. The inner valuation of it is called 
appreciation of life. These matters are of course related. Knowing that one’s life is useful will 
typically add to the appreciation of it.  Yet useful-lives are not always happy lives and not every 
good-for-nothing really cares. This difference has been elaborated in discussions on utilitarian 
moral philosophy, which praises happiness as the highest good. Adversaries of that view hold 
that there is more worth to life than just pleasures and pains. Mill (1861) summarized that 
position in his famous statement that he preferred an unhappy Socrates to a happy fool. 
  
The left top quadrant denotes the meaning of good living conditions. Formerly, the term 
'happiness' was often used for this particular meaning, especially in social philosophy. Currently, 
this matter is mostly called 'quality-of-life' or 'wellbeing'. Other terms are 'welfare' and 'level of 
living' 
 'Livability' is a better word, because it refers explicitly to a characteristic of the 
environment and does not have the limited connotation of material conditions. One could also 
speak of the 'habitability' of an environment, though that term is also used for the quality of 
housing in particular. Elsewhere I have explored that concept of livability in more detail 
(Veenhoven 1996:7-9).   
 Ecologists see livability in the natural environment and describe it in terms of pollution, 
global warming and degradation of nature. Currently, they associate livability typically with 
environmental preservation. City planners see livability in the built environment and associate it 
with sewer systems, traffic jams and ghetto formation. Here the good life is seen as a fruit of 
human intervention. In public health this all is referred to as a 'sane' environment.  
 In the sociological view, society is central. Firstly, livability is associated with the quality 
of society as a whole. Classic concepts of the ‘good society’ stress material welfare and social 
equality, sometimes equating the concept more or less with the welfare state. Current 
communitaristic notions emphasize close networks, strong norms and active voluntary 
associations. The reverse of that livability concept is ‘social fragmentation’. Secondly, livability 
is seen in one’s position in society. For long, the emphasis was on ‘under-class’ but currently 
attention shifts to ‘outer-class’. The corresponding antonyms are ‘deprivation’ and ‘exclusion’. 
 
2.1.2 Life-ability of the person  
The right top quadrant denotes inner life-chances. That is: how well we are equipped to cope with 
the problems of life. This aspect of the good life is also known by different names. Doctors and 
psychologists use the terms 'quality of life' and 'well-being' to denote this specific meaning. There 
are more names however. In biology, this meaning is referred to as 'fitness'. On other occasions, it 
is denoted by the medical term 'health', in the medium variant of the word2, or by psychological 
terms such as 'efficacy' or 'potency'. Sen (1993) calls this quality of life variant 'capability'. I 
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prefer the simple term 'life-ability', which contrasts elegantly with 'livability'. 
 The most common depiction of this quality of life is absence of functional defects. This is 
'health' in the limited sense, sometimes referred to as 'negative health'. In this context, doctors 
focus on unimpaired functioning of the body, while psychologists stress the absence of mental 
defects. This use of words presupposes a 'normal' level of functioning. Good quality of life is the 
body and mind working as designed. This is the common meaning used in curative care. 
 Next to absence of disease, one can consider excellence of function. This is referred to as 
'positive health' and associated with energy and resilience. Psychological concepts of positive 
mental health involve also autonomy, reality control, creativity and inner synergy of traits and 
strivings. A new term in this context is 'emotional intelligence'. Though originally meant for 
specific mental skills, this term has come to denote a broad range of mental capabilities.  This 
broader definition is the favorite in training professions. 
 A further step is to evaluate capability in a developmental perspective and to include 
acquisition of new skills for living. This is commonly denoted by the term 'self-actualization'; 
from this point of view a middle-aged man is not 'well' if he behaves like an adolescent, even if 
he functions without problems at this level. Since abilities do not develop in idleness, this quality 
of life is close to the ‘activity’ in Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia (Ostenfelt, 1994). This 
quality concept is also currently used in the training professions. 
 Lastly, the term 'art of living' denotes special life-abilities; in most contexts this quality is 
distinguished from mental health and sometimes even attributed to slightly disturbed persons. Art 
of living is associated with refined tastes, an ability to enjoy life and an original style of life 
(Veenhoven 2003). 
 
2.1.3 Utility of life   
The left bottom quadrant represents the notion that a good life must be good for something more 
than itself. This presumes some higher values. There is no current generic for these external 
turnouts of life. Gerson (1976: 795) referred to these kinds as 'transcendental' conceptions of 
quality of life. Another appellation is 'meaning of life', which then denotes 'true' significance 
instead of mere subjective sense of meaning.  I prefer the more simple 'utility of life', admitting 
that this label may also give rise to misunderstanding3. Be aware that this external utility does not 
require inner awareness. A person's life may be useful from some viewpoints, without them 
knowing4.  
 When evaluating the external effects of a life, one can consider its functionality for the 
environment. In this context, doctors stress how essential a patient's life is to its intimates. The 
life of a mother with young children is valued as higher than the life of a woman of the same age 
without children. Likewise, indispensability at the workplace figures in medical quality of life 
notions.  
 At a higher level, quality of life is seen in contributions to society. Historians see quality 
in the addition an individual can make to human culture, and rate for example the lives of great 
inventors higher than those of anonymous peasants do. Moralists see quality in the preservation 
of the moral order, and would deem the life of a saint to be better than that of a sinner.   
 In this vein, the quality of a life is also linked to effects on the ecosystem. Ecologists see 
more quality in a life lived in a 'sustainable' manner than in the life of a polluter. In a broader 
view, the utility of life can be seen in its consequences for long-term evolution. As an individual's 
life can have many environmental effects, the number of such utilities is almost infinite.  
 Apart from its functional utility, life is also judged on its moral or esthetic value. 
Returning to Mill's statement that he preferred an unhappy Socrates to a happy fool, Mill did not 
say this just because Socrates was a philosopher whose words have come down to us; it was also 
because he admired Socrates as an outstanding human being. Likewise, most of us would 
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attribute more quality to the life of Florence Nightingale than to that of a drunk, even if it 
appeared that her good works had a negative result in the end. In classic moral philosophy this is 
called 'virtuous living', and is often presented as the essence of 'true happiness'.  
 
2.1.4 Enjoyment of life   
Finally, the bottom right quadrant represents the inner outcomes of life. That is the quality in the 
eye of the beholder. As we deal with conscious humans, this quality boils down to subjective 
appreciation of life. This is commonly referred to by terms such as 'subjective wellbeing', 'life-
satisfaction' and 'happiness' in a limited sense of the word.  
Humans are capable of evaluating their life in different ways. We have in common 
with all higher animals that we can appraise our situation affectively. We feel good or bad 
about particular things and our mood level signals overall adaptation. As in animals these 
affective appraisals are automatic, but unlike other animals it is known that humans can 
reflect on that experience. We have an idea of how we have felt over the last year, while a cat 
does not. Humans can also judge life cognitively by comparing life as it is with notions of 
how it should be. 
Most human evaluations are based on both sources of information, that is: intuitive 
affective appraisal and cognitively guided evaluation. The mix depends mainly on the object. 
Tangible things such as our income are typically evaluated by comparison; intangible matters 
such as sexual attractiveness are evaluated by how it feels. This dual evaluation system 
probably makes the human experiential repertoire richer than that of our fellow-creatures.  
In evaluating our life, we typically summarize this rich experience in overall 
appraisals. For instance, we appreciate domains of life. When asked how we feel about our 
work or own marriage, we will mostly have an opinion. Likewise, most people form ideas 
about separate qualities of their life, for instance how challenging their life is and whether 
there is any meaning in it. Such judgments are made in different time-perspectives, in the 
past, the present and in the future. As the future is less palpable than the past and the present, 
hopes and fears depend more on affective inclination than on cognitive calculation. Next to 
aspects of life, we also judge life-as-a-whole.  
 
2.2  Happiness and other enjoyments 
Even when we focus on subjective enjoyment of life, there are still different meanings associated 
with the word happiness. These meanings can also be charted in a fourfold classification. In this 
case, that classification is based on the following dichotomies: 
 
Life-aspects versus life-as-a-whole 
Above, we have seen that appraisals of life can concern aspects, such as marriage or work-life, 
and one's life-as-a-whole. The word 'happiness' is used in both contexts. Obviously, such 
appraisals are linked. Enjoyment of aspects of life will typically contribute to the satisfaction with 
life as a whole (so-called bottom-up effect), and enjoyment of one's life-as-a-whole appears to 
foster the satisfaction with life-aspects (top-down). Still, these are not identical matters. One can 
have a happy marriage but still be dissatisfied with life-as-a-whole, or be satisfied with life-as-a-
whole in spite of an unhappy marriage.  
 
Passing delight versus enduring satisfaction 
The experience of enjoyment can be short-lived or enduring. Again, the word happiness is used 
for both phenomena. Sometimes it refers to passing moods and at other occasions for stable 
satisfaction. Once more, these matters are related but not the same.  
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When combined, these distinctions produce the fourfold classification presented in scheme 2. 
The difference between part and whole is presented vertically, and the distinction between 
passing and enduring enjoyment horizontally. 
 
2.2.1  Pleasure 
The top-left quadrant represents passing enjoyments of life-aspects. Examples are the delight 
of a cup of tea at breakfast, the satisfaction with a chore done or the enjoyment of a piece of 
art. Nobel laureate Kanahan (1999) calls this 'instant-utilities'. Frequent experience of such 
passing pleasures is probably a necessary condition for enduring satisfaction with life-as-a-
whole, but probably not a sufficient one since life-satisfaction requires also a sense of 
meaning.   
 The term happiness is used in the sense of pleasure, especially by critics of 
utilitarianism5 who thus denounce that moral philosophy as superficial hedonism. 
 
2.2.2  Domain satisfaction 
The top right quadrant denotes enduring appreciation of life-aspects, such as marriage 
satisfaction and job-satisfaction. This is currently referred to as domain-satisfactions. Though 
domain-satisfactions depend typically on a constant flow of instant-satisfactions, they have 
some continuity of their own. For instance, one can remain satisfied with one's marriage even 
if one has not enjoyed the company of the spouse for quite some time.  
 The term happiness is sometimes used in this sense, in particular to denote satisfaction 
with one's career. That use of the word is mostly also polemic and serves to denote that such 
rat-race happiness is not very worthwhile. 
 Satisfaction with major domains of life obviously ads to satisfaction with ones life-as-
a-whole. Yet these things are not the same. One can be satisfied with one's work and 
marriage, but still be dissatisfied with one's life-as-a-whole because one has failed a cause. 
 
2.2.3 Top-experience 
The bottom right quadrant denotes the combination of passing experience and appraisal of 
life-as-a-whole. That combination occurs typically in so-called 'top-experiences', which 
involve short-lived but quite intense oceanic feelings. Mystics and poets use the term 
happiness often in this sense. Yet this meaning should not be equated with enduring 
enjoyment of life-as-a-whole; these phenomena are in fact antithetical, people who go through 
top-experiences most often are typically not the most satisfied with life. 
 
2.2.4  Life-satisfaction 
Lastly, the bottom-right quadrant represents the combination of enduring satisfaction with 
life-as-a-whole. This is happiness in the sense of life-satisfaction. This meaning is clearly the 
most relevant for policy makers and comes closest to the notion of Gross National Happiness.
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2.3 Likeness with the Bhutanese notion of 'Gross national Happiness' 
Close reading of statements of the Bhutanese government on 'Gross national Happiness' learns 
that happiness is seen as a state of an individual and not as a state of society. The goal is to 
promote the happiness of citizens, and the development of society is one of the means (Thingley 
1998: 14-15). Happiness as such is distinguished from its presumed determinants, such as  
'material wealth', 'Enlightenment education', 'natural environment' and 'good governance' 
(Thingley 1998 15-22). This means that the concept belongs in the right half of scheme 1; in the 
column of 'inner' qualities of life. 
The first official document speaks about the 'emotional wellbeing of the population' (7th 5-
year plan pp. 22) and in later statements the term is used interchangeably with 'good mood' and 
'contentment'. This means that the concept addresses experienced outcomes of life and fits the 
right-bottom quadrant in scheme 1, which denotes 'satisfaction'.  
The texts make also clear that happiness is seen as a lasting state of mind, and not as a 
passing mood. The aim is obviously not at creating short-lived thrills. So the concept must be 
placed in the right half of scheme 2 that denotes 'enduring satisfaction'. Likewise, the texts leave 
no doubt that happiness is seen as an appraisal of life-as-a-whole rather than as satisfaction with a 
particular domain of life. So the Bhutanese notion of happiness fits the right-bottom quadrant of 
scheme 2; that is life-satisfaction.  
 
 
2.4 Definition of individual happiness 
In this line, happiness can be defined as the degree to which a person evaluates the overall 
quality of his present life-as-a-whole positively. In other words, how much the person likes 
the life he/she leads.  
 
Scope of evaluation  
The concept of happiness denotes an overall evaluation of life. Therefore, the appraisal that 
life is `exciting' does not mark it as `happy'. There may be too much excitement in life, and 
too little of other qualities. The overall evaluation of life involves all the criteria figuring in 
the mind of the individual: how good it feels, how well it meets expectations, how desirable it 
is deemed to be, etc. 
 
Kind of evaluation 
When we appraise how much we appreciate the life we live, we seem to use two sources of 
information: Affectively, we estimate how well we feel generally, and at the cognitive level we 
compare 'life as it is' with standards of 'how life should be'. The former affective source of infor-
mation seems generally to be more important than the latter cognitive one (Veenhoven 1996a: 
33-35). The word happiness is commonly used for these 'subtotals' as well as for the comprehen-
sive appraisal. I use the terms 'overall happiness' or 'life satisfaction' for the comprehensive 
judgment and refer to the affective and cognitive sub-appraisals as respectively 'hedonic level of 
affect' and 'contentment'. These concepts are delineated in more detail in Veenhoven (1984: 
chapter 2). 
 
Temporal range  
Appraisals of life can concern different periods in time: how life has been, how it is now, and 
how it will probably be in the future. These evaluations do not coincide necessarily; one may 
be positive about past life, but negative about the future. The focus of this paper is on 
 
satisfaction with present life. 
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I am not sure that this definition fully fits with the notion that authors of Bhutanese government 
texts had in mind. Possibly some of them aimed at a specific Buddhist variant and thought of 
serene contentment in the first place. If so, I would still prefer the above definition, since it has 
several advantages. One advantage is that this concept of happiness is broad enough to 
encompass such local variations. Another plus is that this concept has proven to be well 
measurable and comparable across cultures.  
 
2.6      Definition of Gross National Happiness 
Following the above definition of individual happiness, Gross National Happiness can be defined 
as the degree to which citizens in a country enjoy the life they live. Gross National Happiness is 
then an aggregate concept, like the concept of Gross National Product that sums goods and 
services. If every citizen counts equally much in this sum, the concept can be quantified using the 
average of individual happiness in the country.  
 
3 MEASUREMENT OF HAPPINESS 
 
In Bhutanese statements about GNH it is commonly assumed that happiness cannot be 
quantified and compared across time and nations like GNP. Yet the kind of happiness defined 
above can be measured using surveys in which a representative sample of citizens is asked 
how much they enjoy their life-as-a-whole. Since the 1960s this is common practice and this 
research has yielded much information about the usefulness of this method.  
 
Measurement has long been understood as `objective' and `external' assessment, analogous to 
the measurement of blood pressure by a doctor. By now, we know that happiness cannot be 
measured that way. Steady physiological correlates have not been discovered, and probably 
never will be. Nor have any overt behaviors been found to be consistently linked to inner 
enjoyment of life. Like most attitudinal phenomena, happiness is only partially reflected in 
behavior. Though some social behaviors tend to be more frequent among the happy (active, 
outgoing, friendly), such conduct is also observed among unhappy persons. Likewise, non-
verbal behaviors such as frequent smiling or enthusiastic movements appear to be only 
modestly related to self-reports of happiness. Consequently, estimates of someone's happiness 
by his peers are often wrong. Suicidal behavior is probably more indicative of happiness. 
Almost all people who attempt or commit suicide are quite unhappy. However, not all the 
unhappy seek resort to suicide. In fact, only a fraction does. 
 
3.1   Survey questions on happiness 
Inference from overt behavior being impossible, we must make do with questioning. That is, 
simply asking people how much they enjoy their life-as-a-whole. Such questions can be posed 
in various contexts; clinical interviews, life-review questionnaires and common survey 
interviews. The questions can be posed in different ways; directly or indirectly, and by means 
of single or multiple items. A common survey question is: 
 
 
Taking all together, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you currently with your life as a whole?
1             2              3             4             5             6            7            8             9            10
Dissatisfied                                                                                                        Satisfied   
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Since the 1970's, such questions have been included in many 'Quality-of-Life' surveys all over 
the world. There is now a growing body of data on happiness in nations. Presently there are 
comparable surveys in 67 nations. The data are brought together in the 'World Database of 
Happiness' (WDH 2003).  
 
 
3.2 Doubts about happiness self-reports 
Yet there are many qualms about such simple self-reports of happiness. Elsewhere I have 
considered the objections and inspected the empirical evidence for claims about bias. I will 
summarize the main points below. For more detail and references, see Veenhoven 1984 
chapter 3 and Veenhoven 1993, chapter 5. 
 
 
3.2.1 Validity    
Critics have suggested that responses to questions on life-satisfaction actually measure other 
phenomena. Rather than indicating how much the respondent enjoys life, answers would 
reflect his normative notions and desires. 
 
No notion 
One of the misgivings is that most people have no opinion at all about their happiness. They 
would be more aware of how happy they are supposed to be, and report that instead. Though 
this may happen incidentally, it does not appear to be the rule. Most people know quite well 
whether they enjoy life. Eight out of ten Americans think of it every week. Responses on 
questions about happiness tend to be prompt. Non-response on these items is low; both 
absolutely (± 1%) and relatively to other attitudinal questions. `Don't know' responses are 
infrequent as well. 
 A related assertion is that respondents mix up how happy they actually are, with how 
happy other people think they are, given their situation. If so, people considered being well 
off would typically report to be very happy, and people regarded as disadvantaged should 
characterize themselves as unhappy. That pattern is observed sometimes, but it is not general. 
For instance, in The Netherlands, good education is seen as a pre-requisite for a good life, but 
the highly educated appear slightly less happy in comparison to their less educated 
counterparts. 
 
Colored answers 
Another objection concerns the presence of systematic bias in responses. It is assumed that 
questions on happiness are interpreted correctly, but that responses are often false. People 
who are actually dissatisfied with their life would tend to answer that they are quite happy. 
Both ego-defense and social-desirability would cause such distortions.  
 This bias is seen to manifest itself in over-report of happiness; most people claim to be 
happy, and most perceive themselves as happier than average. Another indication of bias is 
seen in the finding that psychosomatic complaints are not uncommon among the happy. 
However, these findings allow other interpretations as well. Firstly, the fact that more people 
say to be happy than unhappy does not imply over-report of happiness. It is quite possible that 
most people are truly happy (some reasons will be discussed below). Secondly, there are also 
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good reasons why most people think that they are more happy than average. One such reason 
is that most people are like critical scientists and think that unhappiness is the rule. Thirdly, 
the occurrence of headaches and worries among the happy does not prove response distortion. 
Life can be a sore trial some times, but still be satisfying on a balance. 
 The proof of the pudding is in demonstrating the response distortion itself. Some 
clinical studies have tried to do so by comparing responses to single direct questions with 
ratings based on depth interviews and projective tests. The results are generally not different 
from responses to single direct questions posed by an anonymous interviewer. 
 
3.2.2  Reliability  
Though single questions on happiness seem to measure what they are supposed to measure, 
they measure it rather imprecisely.  
 When the same question is asked twice in an interview, responses are not always 
identical. Correlations are about +.70. Over a period of a week, test-retest reliability drops to 
circa +.60. Though responses seldom change from `happy' to `unhappy', switches from `very' 
to `fairly' are rather common. The difference between response-options is often ambiguous. 
The respondent's notion about his/her happiness tends to be global. Thus, the choice for one 
answer-category or the next is sometimes haphazard. 
 Because choice is often arbitrary, subtle differences in interrogation can exert 
considerable effect. Variations in place where the interview is held, characteristics of the 
interviewer, sequence of questions and precise wording of the key-item can tip the scale to 
one response or the other. Such effects can occur in different phases of the response process; 
in the consideration of the answer as well as in the communication of it. 
 
Much of these biases are random, and balance out in large samples. Therefore, in large 
samples, random error does not affect the accuracy of happiness averages. Yet it does affect 
correlations, random error 'attenuates' correlations. Random error can be estimated by means 
of multipletrait-multiplemethod (MTMM) studies, and correlations can be corrected 
(disattenuated) on that basis. 
 Some biases may be systematic, especially bias produced by technique of 
interrogation and sequence of questions. Bias of that kind does affect the reliability of 
distributional data. In principle it does not affect correlations, unless the measure of the 
correlate is biased in the same way (correlated error). To some extend, systematic error can 
also be estimated and corrected. 
 
 
3.2.3   Comparability  
Another common qualm is that self-ratings of happiness cannot be meaningfully compared 
between persons and certainly not across cultures. 
 
Interpersonal comparability 
It is commonly assumed that happiness is a matter of comparison of life-as-it-is with 
standards of how life-should-be and it is also assumed that these standards differ highly 
across individuals. Together, these assumptions imply that happiness is not comparable 
interpersonally; score 6 on the above mentioned scale may mean something quite different for 
person A than for person B.  
 If happiness is so idiosyncratic an appraisal indeed, it is unlikely to be correlated to 
hard differences in income, health and companionship. However, that prediction is not 
confirmed in empirical studies. In poor countries at least, income does matter to happiness. 
Happiness is also firmly related health, not only does good health add to happiness, but 
reversely, happiness also sustains physical health and is even a strong predictor of long-term 
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longevity (Danner et. al. 2001). Likewise, happiness is universally related to marriage and 
friendship (Diener 2000). 
 The available data fit better with the theory that happiness depends on the gratification 
of inborn needs and in that context it is likely that the experience of enjoying one’s life has a 
very similar meaning for all humans, comparable to experiences of pain and hunger. I have 
discussed this matter in more detail elsewhere (Veenhoven 1991, 1997). See also Ng (1997) 
on this issue. 
 
Comparability across nations 
Average happiness differs markedly across nations. In scheme 3, we will see that Russians 
score currently 5.4 on a 0-10 scale, while in Canada the average is 7.7. Does that mean that 
Russians really take less pleasure in life? Several claims to the contrary have been advanced. I 
have checked these doubts elsewhere (Ouweneel & Veenhoven, 1991, Veenhoven 1993b). 
The results of that inquiry are summarized below. 
 
Language: The first objection is that semantic differences hinder comparison. Words like 
`happiness' and `satisfaction' would not have the same connotations in different tongues. 
Questions using such terms would therefore measure slightly different matters. I checked that 
hypothesis by comparing the rankorder produced by three kinds of questions on life-
satisfaction: a question about `happiness', a question about `satisfaction with life' and a 
question that invites to a rating between `best- and worst possible life'. The rankorder 
appeared to be almost identical. I also compared responses on questions on happiness and 
satisfaction in two bi-lingual countries, and found no evidence for linguistic bias either. 
 
Desirability: A second objection is that responses are differentially distorted by desirability-
bias. In countries where happiness ranks high in value, people would be more inclined to 
overstate their enjoyment of life. I inspected that claim by checking whether reported 
happiness is indeed higher in countries where hedonic values are most endorsed. This 
appeared not to be the case. As a second check, I inspected whether reports of general 
happiness deviate more from feelings in the past few weeks in these countries, the former 
measure being more vulnerable for desirability distortion than the latter. This appeared not to 
be the case either. 
Response styles: A third claim is that response-styles distort the answers dissimilarly in 
different countries. For instance, collectivist orientation would discourage `very' happy 
responses, because modest self-presentation is more appropriate within that cultural context. I 
tested this hypothesis by comparing happiness in countries differing in value-collectivism, but 
found no effect in the predicted direction. The hypothesis failed several other tests as well. 
 
Western concept?  A related claim is that happiness is a typical western concept, which is 
alien to people in non-western nations. Unfamiliarity would lead to lower scores. If so, we 
can expect more `don't know' and `no answer' responses in non-western nations. However, 
that appeared not to be the case6. 
 
Still another way to check the misgivings about cross-cultural comparability of happiness is to 
consider the correlation between average happiness in nations and characteristics of these 
nations. If conceptions of happiness are so different and responses so differently distorted, we 
will find little correlation with actual wealth, freedom and peace in the country. Yet 
comparative research has learned that about 75% of the observed differences in average 
happiness can be explained that way (Veenhoven 1993, see also section 5.3.7). So the unique 
cultural variance is at best 25% and probably less.  
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3.3     Measure of Gross National Happiness 
Gross National Happiness was defined as the degree to which citizens in a country enjoy their 
life-as-a-whole (cf. Section 2.4) and next we have seen that individual happiness can be 
adequately measured by self-reports. Hence Gross National Happiness can be measured by 
the aggregation of individual happiness ratings as observed in surveys of the general 
population. Gross National Happiness can then be quantified by descriptive statistics of 
general tendency, such as the mean.  
 
    Average happiness in nations 
This is in fact common practice and at this we know the average happiness in 67 nations in 
the 1990s. Some illustrative cases are presented below in scheme 3. The full list is on 
appendix 1. 
 
    Happiness in Bhutan  
Happiness has not yet been assessed in Bhutan. Though a few surveys have been conducted in 
that country, none of these involved questions about happiness. This lack illustrates that the 
concept of Gross National Happiness has served to express an intention in the first place. 
For the time being, we can only speculate about the level of happiness in Bhutan. Yet 
the available data on other countries allow an educated guess. Comparative research has 
revealed strong links between average happiness in nations and several societal characteristics 
and on that basis I predict that current Bhutan will score in the lower middle range between 6 
and 5.  
I do not expect a high level of happiness in present day Bhutan because the material 
standard of life is still too low and the culture is collectivistic. Another reason for my 
expectation is that the country faces major social change. The dramatic fall of happiness in 
the post communist world illustrates that this may reduce happiness temporarily. On the other 
hand Bhutan scores well on quality of governance and the country is in peace. Possibly its 
distinct culture also has a positive effect on average happiness. So I do not expect that 
unhappiness prevails in the country. 
 
 
4 COMBINED MEASURE OF 'HAPPY LIFE YEARS'  
 
The concept of Gross National Happiness can also be operationalized by combining the 
above-discussed measure of average happiness in the country with data about longevity. 
Together that provides an estimate of how long and happy people life in a country. 
  
4.1 Why combine? 
This combination has two advantages: A pragmatic advantage that the duration of happiness 
is taken into account. Next a theoretical advantage is that this combination fits an 
evolutionary perspective on the good life. 
 
Taking duration into account 
One could imagine that people live happy in a country but not long, possibly as a result of too 
much indulgence. If so, many would opt for a less happy but longer life. This illustrates that 
we should not only consider the degree of happiness, but also its duration. 
 A similar problem exists with the use of life-expectancy as a social indicator. If growing 
older means that we spend more years ailing, the rise of longevity does not mark real 
progress. That problem was solved by introducing the measures of 'Disability Adjusted Life 
Years', which count only the number of years spend in good health. Similarly we can compute 
'Happiness Adjusted Life Years'. In section 4.2 I will show how.  
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Significance for biological adaptation 
Longevity is an indicator of successful adaptation for all creatures; any organism perishes if it 
fails to meet the demands of its environment. Survival is the only indicator of good adaptation 
for most species, but in higher animals successful adaptation also reflects in affective 
experience. The basic function of feelings is probably to inform the organism whether it is in 
the right pond or not. Since this faculty is only required in organisms that can move from one 
environment to another, it exists probably only in higher animals and not in plants Morris 
1992).  
 Like other higher animals humans are also endowed with the faculty of affective 
experience. Research has shown that our affective reaction typically precedes cognitive 
appraisals (Zajonc 1980), which suggests that the development of reason in the human species 
did not replace the earlier affective orientation system but came to function next to that. There 
is also evidence that human judgements of their life-as-a-whole draw on affective information 
in the first place (Schwarz & Strack 1991) and that is another indication that this orientation 
system still works.  
 In this view, happiness is another signal of good adaptation, which can be meaningfully 
combined with longevity. If people live long and happy in a society, that society is apparently 
successful in meeting the needs of the human species. 
 
This brings me to the wider point that the outcome of life in happy life years also indicates 
how well the living conditions in the country fit with the life-abilities of its citizens. That link 
is visualized in scheme 4 This scheme presents the same fourfold as in scheme 1, with 
addition of key words from biological adaptation theory. The added arrows signify that both 
happiness and longevity in the right bottom quadrants are the result of preconditions depicted 
in the two top-quadrants and in particular an outcome of the fit between demands of the 
environment and life-ability of the individual. Hence the realized number of happy life years 
in a country indicates the chances for a life and analysis of variation in HLY can therefore 
help to identify the conditions that are most crucial for human thriving.  
 
 
4.2 How combine? 
The number of years citizens live happily in a country can be measured by combining 
information about length of life drawn from civil registrations of birth and death with data on 
overall appreciation of life as assessed in surveys. The following simple formula can be 
applied:  
 
Happy-Life-Years  = Life-expectancy at birth  x  0-1 happiness 
 
Suppose that life expectancy in a country is 50 years, and that the average score on a 0 to 10-
step happiness scale is 5. Converted to a 0-1 scale, the happiness score is than 0,5. The 
product of 50 and 0,5 is 25. So the number of happy life years is 25 in that country. If life 
expectancy is 80 years and average happiness 8, the number of happy life years is 64 (80 x 
0,8).  
 Theoretically, this indicator has a broad variation. The number of Happy Life Years is 
zero if nobody can live in the country at all, and will be endless if society is ideal and its 
inhabitants immortal. The practical range will be between about 20 and 75 years. Presently at 
least, life expectancy at birth in nations varies between 30 and 80, whereas average happiness 
is seldom lower than 0,4 on a 0 to 1 scale and seldom higher than 0,8. The number of happy-
Life-Years will always be lower than standard life expectancy. It can equal real length of life 
only if everybody is perfectly happy in the country (score 1 on scale 0 to 1). 
 High HLY means that citizens live both long and happily, low HLY implies that the life 
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of the average citizen is short and miserable. Medium HLY values can mean three things: 1) 
both moderate length-of-life and moderate appreciation-of-life, 2) long but unhappy life, and 
3) short but happy life.  
I have described this indicator in more detail elsewhere (Veenhoven 1996, 2000). It scored 
highest in a scholarly review of social indicators (Hagerty ea. 2001).  
 
5 FINDINGS ON HAPPY LIFE YEARS IN NATIONS 
 
Happy Life Years can be compared across nations and over time. Such comparisons reveal 
striking differences and these differences can be linked to societal development. Below I 
present some illustrative findings. 
 
5.1 Difference across nations 
Data on Happy-Life-Years in nations are published on the World Database of Happiness 
(WDH 2003). This continuous register of research on subjective enjoyment of life is updated 
regularly. Currently it provides data on 67 nations in the 1990s. These data are presented on 
appendix A. Scheme 5 presents some illustrative cases. 
 
We cannot compute HLY for Bhutan, since we do not yet know average happiness. If we 
assume that average happiness is about 5.5 in Bhutan (cf. section 3.3.2) the number of happy 
life years would be about 347.   
 
5.2 Trend over time 
Time series are available for a few nations, for the USA since 1948, for Japan since 1958 and 
for the first member states of the European Union since 1973. All these nations witnessed a 
rise in the number of happy-life-years. This is mainly because life expectancy augmented in 
all these nations, but in several cases HLY was also boosted by a rise in average happiness. 
The most spectacular case of that kind is Italy, where HLY rose 12 years since 1973.   
 Scheme 6 presents the longest available time series, that of the USA 1948-1998. 
Americans gained 7 Happy-Life-Years over these 50 years. Since average happiness remained 
at the same level over that period, this rise in HLY is entirely due to the rise in life 
expectancy. In this case, the proportional rise of HLY illustrates that this rise in length of did 
not go at the cost of lower quality of life. If the extra years added were spend in misery, HLY 
would have lagged or could even have declined.    
 HLY went down in the former Soviet Union after the velvet revolution. Both happiness 
and life-expectancy plumped after 1990 and especially during the economic crisis in 1996. 
The latest data show a gradual recovery. 
  
 
5.3 Societal correlates of HLY 
The next question is of course whether there is a system in these differences and in particular 
whether the differences fit current conceptions of what a good society is like. To answer that 
question I inspected the statistical relationship between HLY and five societal qualities that 
are currently on the political agenda. These qualities are: 1) material wealth, 2) freedom, 3) 
social equality, 4) brotherhood, and 5) justice. The indicators used for that purpose are 
enumerated in appendix B.  
 The analysis involves three steps: The first step is assessing how each of these societal 
characteristics relates to HLY. For that purpose I plotted scattergrams and computed zero-
order correlations. Next I inspected to what degree the observed correlations could be 
attributed to differences in economic development across nations. For that purpose I 
computed partial correlations, controlling wealth of the country. Lastly I considered how 
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much of the variance in HLY across nations could be explained by these societal 
characteristics together. An overview is presented in scheme 7.  Below I will expand on the 
main findings.  
 
5.3.1 Wealth 
Until recently, quality-of-life in nations was in fact equated with material prosperity and 
measured by GDP per capita. It is now acknowledged that money is not everything, but 
wealth is still prominent in quality-of-life indexes such as the Human Development Index 
(UNPD 2001) and Estes' (1984) Index of Social Progress. How does this hallmark of 
'assumed' quality-of-life relate to our measure of 'apparent' quality-of-life?  
 The relation between income per head and HLY in nations is presented in scheme 8. That 
scattergram shows a strong correspondence, the correlation coefficient is +.73. This result fits 
the common assumption that wealth is essential to quality-of-life. Yet at a closer look one can 
see that there is a limit to the benefits of material wealth. In the scattergram one can recognize 
the curve of diminishing returns. The correlation is mainly in the left segment of the 
scattergram among nations with an income per head below $ 15.000. There is hardly any 
correlation among the richer nations (r = +.18).   
 
 
5.3.2 Freedom 
Opinion about the blessings of freedom is mixed. Individualistic social philosophy assumes that 
people themselves know best what they need, and hence that they will thrive better if they can 
follow their own preferences. Conservatives doubt that people really know what is best for them 
and rather stress the wisdom of tradition and experts. Some schools of thought see different 
effects of different variants of freedom. Currently the New Right is quite positive about economic 
freedom, but at the same time it is critical about freedom in the private sphere of life. Free sex and 
the legalization of soft drugs are seen to as a treat to the quality-of-life. Likewise a common view 
in South-East Asia is that economic freedom will improve the human lot but not political 
freedom. 
 The relation between political freedom and HLY is presented in scheme 9. Again we see 
a positive correlation, but the shape of the relation is linear in this case, which suggests that 
freedom has not yet met its limit. Similar patterns appear in the relation of economic freedom 
and personal freedom with HLY. These findings support the liberal position. I have discussed 
this matter in more detail elsewhere (Veenhoven 1999, 2000b). 
  Free nations are typically also rich nations and hence the partial correlations in table 1 are 
considerably lower than the zero-order correlations. This could mean that the zero-order 
correlations are largely spurious and that wealth is the main determinant of HLY. Yet is it 
also possible that freedom and wealth affect HLY equally much or that freedom affects HLY 
through its effects on the growth of wealth. By lack of good time series we cannot disentangle 
these effects as yet. For the time being, the partial correlations mark a minimum. 
 
5.3.4 Equality 
There is also difference of opinion on the significance of social equality for the quality-of-life 
in nations. Egalitarians claim that social inequality is antithetical to quality-of-life, not only 
because it is morally unjust but also because of its detrimental effects on self-respect and 
social bonds. Conservatives rather stress the positive functions of inequality and expect that 
enforced equality will go at the cost of quality-of-life. The discussion focuses very much on 
income-equality. 
 The evidence in mixed in this case, since not all kinds of equality relate in the same way 
to HLY. Surprisingly there is no statistical association with income inequality. The 
scattergram on scheme 10 shows that people live equally long and happy in nations with 
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small income disparities, such as Japan, as in nation with great income differences, such as 
Mexico. Statistical control for wealth of the nations suggests even a positive effect of income 
inequality. 
 The correlation with inequality between males and females is more in line with egalitarian 
supposition; HLY being higher in nations were women are least discriminated. Yet the partial 
correlation is quite small, which could mean that gender equality works out less beneficial 
after all. 
 HLY relates most strongly with difference in happiness as measured by its standard 
deviation and this correlation remains robust after control for wealth of the nation. Elsewhere 
I have argued that social inequality in nations cannot be measured inclusively by adding 
differences in access to different matters and the disparities in access to relevant resources 
(inputs) reflect best in the dispersion of happiness (output) (Veenhoven 2002). If I am right in 
that, these correlations mean that inequality still matters, though apparently not the specific 
inequalities that figure most prominently on the political agenda these days. 
 
5.3.5 Brotherhood 
Next to freedom and equality, ‘brotherhood’ figured in the slogan of the French revolution 
(Liberté, egalité, and fraternité) and social solidarity is still seen as a prerequisite for a good 
life. In this analysis I considered two aspects of brotherhood in nations, first interpersonal 
respect and cooperation and second ‘organized solidarity’ in collective systems of social 
insurance.  
 The indicators of interpersonal relations relate positively to HLY. The strongest 
correlation is with ‘tolerance’ as measured by acceptance of minority group members as a 
neighbor.  There is also a positive correlation with self-reported trust in compatriots and with 
activity in voluntary organizations. All these correlations are largely independent of wealth of 
the nation. 
 The case of ‘organized solidarity’ is different however. The zero-order correlation 
between social security expenditures and HLY is positive, but control for wealth of the nation 
reveals a negative relationship. I have investigated that matter in more detail elsewhere and 
found indeed that people are not happier and healthier in nations with lavish social security 
systems than in equally rich nations where Father State is less openhanded (Veenhoven 
2000c). Apparently we can live equally well in a residual welfare state. This finding 
illustrates that ‘presumed’ qualities of life do not always match ‘apparent’ quality-of-life. 
 
5.3.6   Justice 
Righteousness is also commonly mentioned as prerequisite for a good life. In this analysis I 
consider three indicators of justice in nations: rule of law, respect of civil liberties and 
prevalence of corruption. The relation between corruption and HLY is depicted in figure 5. 
The scattergram reveals a strong negative relationship with this aspect of injustice. The other 
indicators of justice in nations are also strongly related to HLY. See scheme 11. 
 The partial correlations are also positive, but much smaller. Like in the case of freedom 
this does not necessarily mean that the independent effect of justice is small, since the 
common variance of justice and wealth can be due to an effect of the former on the latter.  
 
 
5.3.7  Explained variance 
As a last step I considered how well these societal inputs predict the output of years lived 
happily. I limited that analysis to the variables of which we have at least 60 cases. This left 
me with wealth, economic freedom, political freedom, income inequality, rule of law and civil 
rights. Together these six societal qualities explain 66% of the variance in HLY in nations. 
Consideration of more variables in smaller nation sets yields R2 values of .85 and more.  
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 This implies that much of the things policy makers aim at do indeed matter for Gross 
National Happiness. Why then bother about measuring that matter? One reason is that not 
everything deemed required for a good life is really necessary. We saw this in the cases of 
income equality and social security. Secondly some of the things that are required today may 
loose relevance tomorrow. This is illustrated by the diminishing utility of wealth. Thirdly, 
HLY is more easily measured than current indexes of presumed quality-of-life and lastly the 
concept of Happy-Life-Years is also easier to understand. 
 
      
6 CONCLUSION 
 
The concept of Gross National Happiness can be operationalized as the degree to which 
citizens in a country live long and happily and can be quantified in the number of Happy Life 
Years (HLY) per capita. 
 
HLY differentiates well across nations and the pattern of differences makes sense. HLY 
differentiates also over time and can therefore serve to monitor long-term progress.  
 
This indicator pairs public appeal with theoretical relevance and has many advantages over 
current indices of social progress such as the Human Development Index.  
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Scheme 1  
Four qualities of life 
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Scheme 2 
Four kinds of satisfaction 
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Scheme 3 
Happiness in nations in the 1990s. Average self-reports on scale 0-10 
 
 
Top 
>7,7 
 
 
Middle range 
± 6,0 
 
Bottom 
<4,0 
 
Switzerland 
 
 
8,1 
 
Bolivia 
 
6,2 
 
Russia 
 
4,2 
 
Denmark 
 
 
8,0 
 
Poland 
 
6,2 
 
Georgia 
 
4,1 
 
Iceland 
 
 
7,8 
 
Bangladesh 
 
6,0 
 
Armenia 
 
3,7 
 
Luxembourg 
 
 
7,8 
 
Turkey 
 
5,9 
 
Ukraine 
 
3,3 
 
Canada 
 
 
7,7 
 
South-Africa 
 
5,7 
 
Moldavia 
 
3,0 
 
Source: World Database of Happiness 
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 Scheme 4 
Biological view on relations between qualities of life 
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Scheme 5 
Happy-Life-Years in nations in the 1990s 
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Middle range 
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Scheme 6 
Happiness Adjusted Life Years in the USA 1948-1998  
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Scheme 7 
Societal Qualities and Happy-Life-Years in 67 nations in the 1990s 
 
 
Condition in nation 
 
 
Correlation with HLY 
 Zero-order Wealth  
Controlled 
N 
 
Wealth 
• Purchasing power per head * +.73 - 66 
 
Freedom 
• Economic * +.71 +.38 64 
• Political  * +.53 +.13 63 
• Personal  +.61 +.31 45 
 
Equality 
• Disparity in incomes * -.10 +.37 62 
• Discrimination of women -.46 -.12 51 
• Disparity in happiness -.64 -.37 54 
 
Brotherhood 
• Tolerance +.72 +.43 55 
• Trust in compatriots +.20 +.20 37 
• Voluntary work +.40 +.31 53 
• Social security +.34 -.27 34  
 
Justice 
• Rule of law * +.65 +.20 64 
• Respect of civil rights * +.60 +.20 60 
• Corruption -.73 -.32 40 
 
Explained variance by variables marked with * 
 
 
66% 
 
60 
Indicators described on appendix B 
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Scheme 8 
Wealth and Happy-Life-Years in 66 nations in the 1990s 
1995 Purchasing power p/c
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Scheme 9    
Political freedom and Happy-Life-Years in 63 nations in the 1990s 
political freedom
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Scheme 10 
Income Inequality and Happy-Life-Years in 62 nations in the 1990s 
1990s Gini index: income inequlity
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Scheme 11 
Corruption and Happy-Life-Years in 40 nations in the 1990s 
corruption
1086420-2
19
90
s 
ye
ar
s 
liv
ed
 s
at
is
fie
d
70
60
50
40
30
USA
Turkey
Switserland
S-Korea
S-Africa
Russia
Nigeria
Mexico
Japan
Italy
Greece
Denmark
Colombia
China
Britain
Bolivia
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ruut Veenhoven 28 Happy life years
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Livability of the environment  Appendix A 
Apparent quality-of-life in 67 nations in the 1990s 
 
 Nation 
 
 
 
Enjoyment  
of life1
(scale 0 - 1) 
 
Length 
of life2
(in years) 
 
 
Happy 
Life Years3
 
 
 Argentina 6,8 72,6 49,1 
 Armenia 3,7 70,9 26,2 
 Australia 7,3 78,2 56,9 
 Austria 6,1 76,7 47,0 
 Azerbaijan 4,9 71,1 34,7 
 Bangladesh 6,0 56,9 34,2 
 Belarus 4,4 69,3 30,3 
 Belgium 7,3 76,9 56,4 
 Bolivia 6,2 60,5 37,5 
 Brazil  7,0 66,6 46,3 
 Britain 7,2 76,8 55,4 
 Bulgaria 4,3 71,2 30,5 
 Canada   7,7 79,1 60,6 
 Chile   6,9 75,1 52,0 
 China   6,74 69,2 46,7 
 Colombia 8,14 70,3 57,1 
 Costa Rica 7,94 76,6 60,8 
 Croatia 5,5 71,6 39,6 
 Czecho-Slovakia 5,9 71.7 42.3 
 Denmark 8,0 75,3 59,9 
 Dominican Rep. 6,8 70,3 47,9 
 Ecuador 6,4 69,5 44,5 
 El Salvador 7,4 69,4 51,7 
 Estonia 5,0 69,2 34,6 
 Finland 7,5 76,4 57,1 
 France  6,4 78,7 50,5 
 Georgia 4,1 73,2 29,7 
 Germany 6,7 76,4 51,4 
 Ghana   7,74 57,0 43,9 
 Greece  5,3 77,9 41,4 
 Guatemala 7,2 66,1 47,3 
 Honduras 7,0 68,8 48,0 
 Hungary 5,6 68,9 38,6 
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 Iceland 7,8 79,2 61,8 
 India   6,2 61,6 38,5 
 Ireland 7,6 76,4 58,4 
 Italy   7,0 78,0 54,6 
 Japan   6,3 79,9 50,0 
 Latvia   4,8 68,0 32,5 
 Lithuania 5,0 70,2 35,1 
 Luxembourg 7,8 76,1 59,2 
 Macedonia 5,2 71,9 37,6 
 Mexico  7,3 72,1 52,5 
 Moldavia 3,0 67,8 20,5 
 Netherlands 7,5 77,5 58,3 
 Nicaragua 7,6 67,5 51,2 
 Nigeria 6,34 51,4 32,6 
 Norway  7,4 77,6 57,5 
 Panama  7,1 73,4 52,3 
 Paraguay 6,8 69,1 46,7 
 Peru 6,0 67,7 40,4 
 Philippines 6,5 67,4 43,7 
 Poland  6,2 71,1 43,8 
 Portugal 6,7 74,8 50,5 
 Romania 5,4 69,6 37,7 
 Russia  4,2 65,5 27,8 
 South-Africa 5,7 64,1 36,7 
 South-Korea 6,3 71,7 45,3 
 Slovenia 6,0 73,2 43,8 
 Spain   6,5 77,7 50,8 
 Sweden  7,6 78,4 59,9 
 Switzerland 8,1 78,2 63,0 
 Turkey  5,9 68,5 40,4 
 Ukraine 3,3 68,5 22,5 
 Uruguay 6,7 72,7 49,0 
 USA     7,4 76,4 56,9 
 Venezuela 6,4 72,3 46,0 
 
Technical details 
 
1. Average enjoyment of life assessed by means of surveys in general public samples. This list is based on 
responses to questions on life-satisfaction. 
• Most scores are based on responses to the following question: 
"All things considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your life-as-a-whole now? 1 
dissatisfied …………………. 10 satisfied". 
Scores on this 1-10 scale were transformed linearly to range 0-10. This transformation in explained in 
the introductory text, chapter 7.3.  
• Scores of most Latin American nations are based on responses to a somewhat different question. 
"In general, would you say that you are satisfied with your life? Would you say that you are…very 
satisfied (4), quite satisfied (3), satisfied (2) or not very satisfied (1)?" 
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o Scores on this 1-4 scale were transformed to range 0-10 by means of expert weighing of 
response options. This so-called 'Thurstone procedure' is explained in chapter 4/3 of the 
introductory text.  
o Since the above 1-10 questions have also been used in five of these Latin American nations, I 
could check whether this transformation yields comparable results. The transformed scores 
appeared to be slightly higher and were therefore corrected by subtracting 0,5 point.   
• This combination of scores on two slightly different questions results in a list of 67 cases. The number 
of cases is smaller if one restricts to responses on identical questions. Restriction to a common question 
on 'happiness' yields 60 cases and limitation to the above 1-10 life-satisfaction item 54 cases. 
    
2. Life expectancy is estimated on the basis of civil registrations of birth and death. Source: Human 
Development Report 2001, table 1. 
 
3. Life-satisfaction scores may be inflated in some countries, due to under sampling of rural population or 
inexperience with anonymous interviewing. Dubious cases are China, Colombia, Ghana and Nigeria. 
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Appendix B 
Characteristics of nations, used in correlational analysis 
 
 
Wealth 
• Income  Purchasing power per head in 1995 
Human Development Report 1999, table 1 (UNDP) 
 
Freedom 
• Economic Index of economic freedom 1999. 
Heritage Foundation 
• Political Index of suppression of political rights 1994-95 (reversed) 
Karantnycky et. al. 1995 
• Personal Index of freedom in personal life. Involves absence of restrictions 
to traveling, religion, marriage, sex and suicide. Both legal 
restrictions and public acceptance  
Veenhoven  2000b 
 
Equality 
• Income equality Gini index 
Human Development Report 2001 table 12 (UNDP) 
• Gender equality SIGE index of gender inequality.  
Dijkstra 2000 
• Equality in happiness Standard deviation of life satisfaction.  
Veenhoven 2002 
 
Brotherhood 
• Tolerance Responses to survey questions about the kind of people one 
would like to have as a neighbor. 
World Value Surveys 1990-1995, items 51-60 
• Trust in compatriots Responses to survey question 
World value Surveys 1990-1995, item 41 
• Voluntary work Responses to survey questions 
World value Surveys 1990-1995, items 28-35 
• Social security Expenditures in percent of GDP 
ILO 1995 
 
Justice 
• Rule of law Index of Institutional Quality 1997-98 
IMF, World Economic Outlook October 2000  
• Violation of civil rights Index of suppression of civil rights 1994-95 
Karantnycky et. al. 1995  
• Corruption Rating by foreign businessmen and journalists 
Transparency International 
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NOTES 
 
1 In sociology, the term 'life-chances' is used in the more limited meaning of access to scarce 
resources in society. 
 
2 There are three main meanings or health: The maxi variant is all the good (WHO definition), the 
medium variant is life-ability, and the mini-variant is absence of physical defect 
 
3 A problem with this name is that the utilitarians used the word utility for subjective appreciation of 
life, the sum of pleasures and pains. 
 
4  Frank’s (1946) logo-therapy aims to make people believe in meanings of their life they do not see. 
 
5  Utilitarian moral philosophy holds that the good and bad of all actions should be judged by its 
effects on human happiness, the morally best action being the one that provides the 'greatest happiness for 
the greatest number'. Jeremy Bentham (1798) is a spokesman of this view. When applied on public choice, 
this theory is known as 'rule-utilitarianism'. 
  
6. In Japan do we see a higher non-response indeed, though still below 5%. Still this not a general non-
western pattern. In India and Nigeria non-response is at the same level as in western nations. 
7  Life expectancy in Bhutan was 61.5 in 1999 (Human Development Report 2001, pp. 143) 
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